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In the first version there were two main types of body armor. Kevlar and steel plate. Will they use the later ceramic armor? Helmets were the same. Kevlar with better protection and steel. Even our players running characters from eastern countries wanted the Kevlar stuff.

Interesting question!

As far as I can recall, ceramic inserts or "trauma plates" started to be used in "ground pounders'" body armour around 2000 (early verions were used by helicopter crews much earlier).

I would postulate — and I hope Tomas agrees — that the 90's of this scenario, when there is no détente, but rather an escalation of political tensions, also sees a considerable acceleration in the development of military technology, instead of the retardation we saw IRL.

I would therefore say that technology that was introduced into service IRL around 2000, should in the Twilight scenario certainly be in service by 1997, when the actual shooting war starts.


BTW, I believe the Warsaw Pact had their own aramid-based body armour; just not using DuPont's brand name "Kevlar". The 6B3 that was made from 1980 and used in Afghanistan and the 6B5 introduced just before the collapse all used the "EKRAN" aramid panels.

I did not see any 'retardation' of new technology in the real world in that period. Less platforms for sure, but tech was still all the rage... probably too much (and we are still paying the bill). If you look where axes were actually made it was the relatively safer, less headline-prone, projects that get axed. For example the A6G Intruder was axed before the A-12 Avenger (and probably the A-15 was a paper pipde dream all the way). The Osprey continued forward and sponged more and more money due to its own problems. On the other hand the cost of the high profile projects skyrocketed as their problems (as an USN captain once said, put three new systems in the same platform and the whole thing will not work). As Colonel Hopkins said in his work on strategic reconnaissance the issue is when industry look at defense department was a way to fund their own R&D (something we are often seeing).

Ceramic body armor became more of a priority with the rise in light infantry operations. With the focus being NATO rather than contingency operations ceramic armor was neither a priority nor a concern. Remember by 1990 Mech Inf doctrine saw the dismounts as part of the vehicle rather than a different entity. IT changed more due to pressure of contingency operations often 'other than war', and a misplaced belief on the primacy of dismounts in these settings. And then you have body armor that is to heavy for a dismount to properly operate, and also creates long term health problem (spinal cord damage...). So back to drawing boards...

No ease in tension, would see larger armies and defence budgets, but also more focus on MLU programs, because they provide more definite and quick returns. A lot of the program we have now are long term ones (Joint Silly Fighter or Little Crappy Ship anyone?) based on the assumption there is no immediate risk of hostility (from the Military establishment) and a need to keep R&D open because of slump in actual production (from the industry). In US for example there would me more funding to keep the M60A3, M48A5, and M113A3 fleets viable (to compensate for the fixed monthly production of M1A1 and A2) to equip a larger USARNG force structure, than to new projects. So probably Ceramic armor would have taken an even more backseat than in reality. Maybe things would have changed after one year of war with more infantry casualties. But not so sure. My two cents extrapolation of trends of course.

I'd have to disagree with that assessment, quite vehemently.

Yes, there are fringe examples that point in the direction you point out, but looking at the large trends, the end of the Cold War puts a huge brake on development of military technology.
And why wouldn't it? Why invest significant resources in something that has now and forever become completely redundant, as the reasoning at the time went among politicians and civilian decision makers?

Just consider MBT's — development in weapons, armour, fire control, etc. Consider the rate of development just during the decade-and-a-half from the end of the 70's to the mid-90's:

• The UK goes from Chieftain to Challenger to Challenger 2
• The US goes from M60 to M1 to M1A1 to M1A2
• West Germany goes from Leopard A4 to A5, to Leopard 2 to A1 to A2 to A3 to A4 to A5

Each of these represent a technological advancement, often highly significant, over preceding models. Similar lists can be made for many other countries.

In the two-and-a-half decades that have passed since, the UK is still with the Challenger 2, with life extension improvements (LEP), the US is still with the M1A2, also with incremental improvements (to "C"), and Germany has advanced all the way to Leopard 2A7 (woo-hoo!).

Same can be said about fighter aircraft, ship and submarine development, firearms, missile systems at all levels ... yes, there has been development since the early/mid-90's, but compare the rate of progression in technology during the decades immediately preceding 1990 with that during the decades immediately after, and you will see a radical retardation.

I'd postulate that during the 90's of the Twilight scenario, not only does the rate of development continue unabated; it will accelerate.
Necessarily simplifying of course, but I'd surmise that by break of hostilities in 1997, we could safely introduce many technologies and hardware that didn't enter service IRL until 2000-2002 — even later, in some cases — without breaking suspension of disbelief too much. And create a slightly more interesting milieu in the process.

Vader,

you assume that tech development is proceeding at a constant, linear, speed. I assume it is not. Let's go tanks...

Chieftain and Challenger I are not that far apart. As Bruce Newsome points out the Challenger I was a political decision (to keep Vickers running) rather than a military one. The big development was the Charley 2. A Chieftain Mk 12/13 or an hypothetical Mk13 or Mk14 using Chobam armor and, possibly, a new engine, would have been a better development. There is no real improvement except engine reliability and chobam between a Mk12 and a Challenger 1. Challenger 2 is an entirely new tank. The main issue with the Challenger is that, barring a reliable breakthrough in tank tech, the Challanger is quite state of the art. Why broke what is working? They made incremental improvement, but right now, there is very little alternative. Okay we are talking UK so it is a quite weird environment. But on the other hand, the big game changer hailed at the time of the original t2k like the LP gun or sufficiently small EM gun, utterly failed. The development cost were too high compared with returns or technical issues. Then you had 140mm guns, promised to be the next shiny thing... okay... heavier, required heavier rounds, and penetrations increase was marginal, and could be obtained with better rounds for 120mm.

It is like the Mk18 torpedo and its magnetic exploder. The latter could not work due to physics (the magnetic field of s ship changes based on the distance from the equator) not money. Of course the MK18 had plenty of other issues, and they were fixed with money and testing, but underlining issues based on incomplete sciences could not be fixed.

Leo 1 and Leo 2 are different tanks based on different approaches and expectations. You can even argue that the Leo 1 was a dead end, and the Leo 2 was simply acknoweldging the Britihs were right with the Chieftain. Then you just incrementally improve it. But you can also argue that the whole M46-47-48-60 series were indeed just incremental improvement from 1947 to the 60s. US tank tech did not move forward until the MBT70 (and it was a failure) and the M1. The M1 appears to have reached the envelope's edge. The new project to replace the Abrams (FCS if memory serves me...) was a troubled one not because funding but because conflicting requirements, constant in-Army wraggling over missions, and frankly fantasy expectations. Right now the big issue is not a new FCS, but developing an M1 upgrade with a diesel engine, hopefully with the same power performance of the current turbine, but less fuel thirst. Even the Armata ended up being less than promised because the shiny concept originally envisioned was much less shiny in reality.

On the other hand looks at money suckers like the Osprey, JSF or LCS. The Osprey is a case study. It could work, it is now more or less working, but it was a vehicle (ac or helo... you chose) with plenty of issues that required time and trial and error to solve. It was a program started in the later 80s. It increased in cost to level of Star Wars Empire silliness... but it was felt the technology involved provided decent tactical returns, plus several USMC commandants chained themselves hand and feet to the program. Of course you can argue that experience in A'stan show that the advantages are not that marked, and they are balanced (or out weighted) by a massive maintenance requirement.

Another example is jet engine technology. The USN put that almost as number 1 priority after 1945. Money was overflowing. Yet until the late 50 engines were crap. The Tiger and the Demon were basically doomed by their engines. For all the money spent the engines were never meeting their expected power output, reliability, and weight. And you have fighters lasting only a couple of year because they were... crap, often by engine problems. Then you have the GE J79, it worked more or less as promised. You got the F4. The F-4 was around for... yup the Rhino is still around. The JASDF is retiring its last this year. You had a newer generations of engines that improved on success and planes designed around them, but then you stopped. The development of jet engine required 20 years to reach a decent level. Then basically stagnated and not because funding, but because it has reached its maturity. After the 70s there is no real improvement. We got super-cruise back in the 60 (the TSR-2 was capable of it). Today what you see are incremental improvements. The potential new thing were the hybrid engines of the SR-71, but they ended up being relatively unsuited to combat aircraft.

I stick to my points.

Said that, I like t2k for the mix of equipment. If we go for the everything top of the line as it is now (2020 not even 2000) it kills variance, it made it not really cold war.

I'd postulate that during the 90's of the Twilight scenario, not only does the rate of development continue unabated; it will accelerate.
Necessarily simplifying of course, but I'd surmise that by break of hostilities in 1997, we could safely introduce many technologies and hardware that didn't enter service IRL until 2000-2002 — even later, in some cases — without breaking suspension of disbelief too much. And create a slightly more interesting milieu in the process.

I disagree. Not only that is realistic, but that it is also 'interesting' (and I would argue that this is a crappy word choice on my part because... I found your idea interesting... but in another milieu! I also want to say it clearly, I enjoy the discussion and meant no disrespect!) . There is also the issue that for all our expertise we are basically making stuff up. We have really no idea of what T2k 1995 would look. Counterfactual usually become exercise in assumptions after two or three variations...

But for me, the big charm of t2k, and I assume for 'some' others, is the 'retro' setting (well retro, I still recall Leo1A2 as standard tanks...) . It is the old cold war gone hot, and then a bit off rails... I lie the idea of US Army regulars in K-pot, but NG units still with steel helmets (and it was mixed in 1989 Panama, with the 6th Marines still in old helmets). I like having some units in J and other in H series. Just my opinion.... and one of the positive elements of an RPG approach opposed to a straight on wargame, is that, as long all the tools are provided, you can then slightly adjust the setting to your taste.

Arrigo74,

Actually, your assumption regarding my assumption is false. I endeavour to analyse the underlying processes that regulate the rate of technological development. And the rate of tech development has a very simple, and very effective, throttle.

Having worked my entire professional life in the field, I can state with absolute confidence that the rate of Research & Innovation, Research & Development, Product Development, and subsequent implementation of new technology on this level is heavily dependent — one might even say, exclusively dependent — on funding. Increase funding, and you increase the progress rate. Cut funding, and you cut progress.

As funding for military technology comes pretty exclusively from governmental coffers, changes in the political environment will affect funding, which will affect how quickly or slowly new technologies and hardware see light of day.
We saw this happening so very clearly on either side of 1990. Military technology sped merrily along in a multitude of areas all through the seventies and eighties, when national security was highly prioritised and funding was generous — and then suddenly slammed the brakes pretty much across the board almost from one year to the next, when political leaders decided we'd reached the end of history, and funding was reduced to a trickle and programmes were axed ... and as you note yourself, even then, not always with the wisest prioritisations.

I can't say that I see anything I read in your post directly negating the points I am making. I don't see the viewpoints necessarily being mutually contradictory.

It is also indeed as you note: some technologies are contingent on development in one or — often — several parallel fields before they can realise their potential — the jet engine is a prime example. Not seldom, an idea is simply too advanced to fully realise with available materials, production methods, ancillary components or solutions, etc., and other technologies need to catch up first.
In other cases, breakthroughs await someone having the right idea. Technologies can appear mature or stagnated or even impractical until the right person makes the right connections.
And until that moment happens, no amount of funding can do any more than affect the number of people involved in the project, thereby affecting the chances of the right bright spark being involved.

But for the question of getting hardware from a few years later fielded a few years earlier in the Twilight setting, these dynamics do not apply! It's much more straightforward:

We know that the hardware and technology that got implemented ... well, it did get implemented. There is therefore no speculation or guesswork about technical practicality or feasibility involved.
Which means that in an alternate scenario with more funding — never mind less cut funding! — there is a very real possibility that it would end up being developed and implemented quicker than it did IRL.

(And just for the record — I, too, enjoy the discussion! I find a good discussion with a well-informed partner such as yourself has value all of its own.)

I will admit first and foremost that I TLDR'd this thread, just to say this: I'm happy to give my players nice, light, highly effective ceramic armors. I'm also happy to irreparably shatter them the first time they run up against a rifle round.

There's a good discussion to be had here about how doctrine would adapt (and at whose direction??) on the fly as a mechanized army rapidly dissolves into a non-mechanized, infantry-based one. (maybe you guys ended up having it, I suppose I should now read the rest of the thread)

Not we did not yet had the doctrine debate!

I just said that there was a switch from mechanized forces to infantry in the real world after Somalia and Bosnia, that shifted interest on personal protection.

As for mech vs inf... it is an interesting question. On one side of the debate you have Major Tyrone Bomba (of 3W, TSR, Decision, and Compass fame) who argue that the big lessons of WW2 was the primacy of mechanized forces and that armies ditched infantry afterwards. He is the same guy who now says primacy of SOF in his games... but then whole mech brigades suddenly became SOF... for the wargamers here, he was the designer of Nato Nukes and Nazis!

On the other hand you have David Isby, and to a lesser extent the late Paddy Griffith that argued it was to become an attrition contest reminiscent of WW1, and it would have reverted to artillery, infantry and tanks. They also point out that no army was fully mechanized in 1945, and even the US army was largely motorized rather than mechanized.

The middle ground was occupied by a lot of people...

some food for campaign. US Army infantry division were not completely mechanized until the late 70, and then you saw the rise of the light divisions. You can argue that for all purposes M113, FV432, VAB, and BTR were just taxis and not real mech infantry stuff. Thus infantry would have still been there. You can also see the 7th Army and Soviet GSFG as shop windows and core hammers, rather than representation of whole forces. Look at the British Army of the time. Basically the mech stuff was in BAOR, and behind that tiny crust it was largely an infantry (often leg not even motor) army.

There is also the argument that all the actual real world stuff is not all that good. Yes it protects you, but slows you down, makes you unwieldy and makes you a better target...

My two cents is that we would have returned to 1944-1945. The first tier units (basically those forward deployed on both side of the IGB and around) would have been the core mech forces and priority of replacements would have gone to them. The initial surge of NG units and CAT 2 unuts would have been used as such, but with at least in the US side, with higher proportion of M113s thus being some sort of an hybrid. The Soviet were altogether different with their own MRD being split between BMP and BTR (did they saw something?). On the longer run you will see a more distinct mech-motor-leg approach. With offensive (and counterattack) forces being as mech as possible, the other unit being leg+ tank support. And the mix would have survived even after the exchange of nukes, probably with smaller and smaller mech forces.