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I think we are universally in agreement that combined arms formations are the way to go, not least because tanks need infantry support to guard their flanks; especially in terrain where they cannot fully leverage their advantages — long-range firepower, frontal aspect protection, speed and mobility.

These advantages are, BTW, also the reason why tanks prefer open terrain. Not because they need to cross it to reach cities.

But I concur with Arrigo — studying ammo expenditure data from the October War would be very interesting! The Arab-Israeli wars are generally speaking likely the most relevant to study in this context.

I've said it before, but it seems it bears repeating: the technology and organisation of armoured warfare and its supporting functions have evolved very drastically in the hundred years tanks have been around.
We need therefore to be very careful indeed in applying observations from too far back during that short history mutatis mutandis to the late Cold War!

Likewise, we need to be very careful in applying any events from IRL history that take place from 1989 onwards to the Twilight setting, as many decisions from that year on clearly were driven by a realisation that the Cold War was ending.


It bears noting that the actual goals of a war can vary ... quite a lot. In the end, the only general statement that can hold true is that a war's ultimate goal is to secure whatever objectives that were the point of starting it in the first place. For instance, if Russia's goal in invading Sweden is to secure the landmasses guarding Öresund and Kattegat, whether or not Sweden's leadership surrenders or concedes will be completely irrelevant to them, as long as they achieve their territorial goals.
I can recommend reading von Clausewitz, if you haven't already.

critical terrain (which, again, is cities)

You reiterate that as a truism ... but could you motivate it? I honestly don't see why cities would be anything but an obstacle.

I countered a bunch of aramis's motivations to why cities are important on the previous page. Could you please present your arguments, to illuminate where you consider my reasoning fallacious?

Be careful with exercise, often they tend to follow expectations.

Maybe ... but it is still factual data in the equation. You are a historian, too; you know we aren't allowed to casually wave off data just because it doesn't fit our model...

Looking at footage from Syria, tanks without infantry are easy pickings in cities.

Not just cities - any urbanization. Or forest, for that matter.

Note that in the US, Cities definition varies, in Alaska, for example, any "white" local government with elected office is a city; without elected government (usually the chamber of commerce is the functional government of such places) is a town, and any indigenous population center is a village if it's not a city. When I say city, I include pretty much any urbanization over 2000 persons, because that's the minimum for a Class IV city in my home state. Different states differentiate differently.
THe town I now live outside of, Alsea, Oregon, is 5000 people. No parishes, no formal market square, but a general store, a gas station, a school, a bar, a restaurant, a library and a health center. It's officially a city... So, @Vader - you're making distinctions that I don't. Linguistic issues. All those "towns" with manufacturing? To most americans, they are cities. Just small ones.

When I say market, I'm using it in the older sense of an established place of sale, not "the sum of buyers"

I think aramis did a very good job of breaking down most of the reasons why cities are critical terrain. If that alone wasn't enough to convince you, perhaps you just can't be convinced. Maybe this has something to do with terrain that's fairly unique to Sweden, and the Swedish doctrine that has emerged from that. Maybe you just have a very different foundational understanding of terrain entirely (for instance, you mention the Arab-Israeli wars as a good model to look at; I happen to find that the Arab-Israeli wars, outside of maybe the Golan Heights and Lebanon, have very few lessons to teach about WW3 in Europe, on the basis of terrain alone. It's good for examining systems and C3 issues as they pertain to doctrine in actual use, but IMO that's about it.)

A final thought, though: cities do not appear by chance. They end up where they are because of their own form of natural selection, based on a wide variety of natural, economic, and societal factors, all of which make them also high priority objectives in warfare. They are critical crossroads, river crossings, mountain passages, population centers, logistics and resource production centers, and more. As the saying goes, "Amateurs discuss tactics, professionals discuss logistics." The long tail of modern armies means they are far from self-sufficient. What they do not have, and cannot receive, they will take. In many cases from civilians. All roads lead both literally and figuratively back to cities.

Not just cities - any urbanization. Or forest, for that matter.

It's taken me awhile living in the US to get used to this but yes I understand you.

I call the place I was born, London, a city. Where I live here in the US, has a population of 100,000 and is referred to as a city but that description falls short of the mark to me.

Coming back to the topic, the presence and use of tanks in the T2k game I am planning is negligible to zero. With the loss of the supply chain for spares, ammo and fuel I can't see a practical use. It's not as if they're comfortable to sleep in

What little I know about ambushing a vehicle column says that as soon as the firing starts, get out of the vehicle because its a bullet magnet and a matter of time before the bullets are big enough to poke holes in the vehicle and you

It is quite easy to disable a tank in a wide variety of ways, especially up close, even if you can't actually poke holes in it. That's not too bad of a problem for that tank as long as it has friends and recovery/repair facilities. As each becomes more rare, it becomes a more and more massive problem.

It is quite easy to disable a tank in a wide variety of ways, especially up close, even if you can't actually poke holes in it. That's not too bad of a problem for that tank as long as it has friends and recovery/repair facilities. As each becomes more rare, it becomes a more and more massive problem.

A while back I remember reading the stats on M1 losses in Iraq. I forget for which conflict. The number of mobility kills was a lot higher than I expected as I don't know much more than I can read online and what you can read online should not be taken too seriously. Thinking about that tho, it's logical. The tracks are only partially armoured and it won't take that much energy to pop them.

Re poking holes in vehicles, sorry I wasn't clearer, I was thinking lightly armoured or more likely soft skinned vehicles.

Well, it applies to pretty much everything. There's armor, and then there's all the parts that really can't be effectively armored. Under sustained fire, all of that is going to fail pretty soon almost regardless of how much armor you have.

IIRC, the overwhelming majority of US tank casualties in Iraq were from friendly fire from Bradleys. A 25mm autocannon is more than enough to disable the tracks, optics, stowage, radio masts, and many other important components of a tank.

IIRC, the overwhelming majority of US tank casualties in Iraq were from friendly fire from Bradleys. A 25mm autocannon is more than enough to disable the tracks, optics, stowage, radio masts, and many other important components of a tank.

Did they list the reasons? Fog of war or was there something systematic behind the FF?

I don't know, I might not even be remembering right. I haven't had much time to look. A quick peek through some documents found this passage in a GAO report that is pretty relevant to everything we've been discussing here:

Bradley and Abrams crews reported problems obtaining repair parts, and many had exhausted their limited supply of some parts by the end of the loo-hour ground war. Because of these problems, according to some Army logistics personnel, sustainability could have become a major problem had the war lasted longer. Crews also experienced problems in positively identifying enemy targets and in having to use outdated and unreliable radios.