Heffe
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Timeline question

Tue 09 Aug 2022, 09:07

Hey all, a question for Tomas and the writers at FL regarding the timeline in T2K, specifically regarding the lead up to Operation Reset. The Ref book states that in 1998, the Soviets manage to break through to southern Germany, taking Nuremberg, Munich, and Leipzig by way of Austria and the Czech Republic. With the placement of the US V corp in Slovakia mentioned as well as the rest of BLUFOR unit placement in FL’s canon, that would mean that the Soviets would be attacking almost certainly northwest from Hungary, which would leave a big corridor of Soviet units travelling between the Alps and the Carpathian Mountains.

My big question to you all is this, since nothing is ever mentioned after the Soviet advance on southern Germany, does that mean that the Soviets are still in possession of those three German cities in the year 2000? If you all could just confirm or refute that single question, it would help enormously in figuring out what’s happening down in the Balkan Peninsula for Refs.
 
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Ursus Maior
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Re: Timeline question

Thu 11 Aug 2022, 14:57

From a strategic point of view I cannot imagine a scenario, where the US has deployed V Corps in Slovakia and III Corps in Poland, but the Soviets still occupy Leipzig. The city is so far north that it would be imperative for NATO, German and US forces in particular, to secure Leipzig and even Nuremberg as rear areas for both corps to function. Indeed, having V Corps in Slovakia likely means that Bundeswehr units have retaken Leipzig (and all of Thuringia and Saxony) and probably US forces retook Nuremberg. I'd argue that the same is true for Munich, since sending V Corps into Slovakia through the Czech Republic alone would be to risky. Instead, securing a second route could only lead through Austria, with Vienna being vis-a-vis to Bratislava, and thus Munich would be a logical "big step" to secure first.

However, it's not entirely impossible for Munich to remain in Soviet hands, if V Corps and supporting forces (historically by the mid-1990s three German divisions plus territorial defense forces were present) would have failed to take Munich or chosen to circumvent it. We know to little about Southeastern Europe and the strategic position of the Soviets by then to determine, if this would've been militarily feasible. It most certainly would have meant that substantial Soviet forces would have remained South of Munich in Western Austria, enough to defend against a sizeable NATO attack. I can only imagine that this would mean that Soviet forces would have a strong foothold in Carinthia and neigbouring Slovenia, probably occupying Trieste. In order to secure supplies, lines of communication (LOCs) must exist, however, meaning that Croatia and/or the Adriatic Sea must be open for the Soviets. Croatia can only be envisioned to be open for the Soviets, if the Serbians somehow joined the Soviets, historically not unlikely, and succeeded in dominating ex-Yugoslavia. That would be a major departure from our own history and difficult to imagine, given that Croatia was an independent nation by the end of 1995.

On the other hand, securing the Adriatic Sea is only possible, if Italy poses no threat and Croatia doesn't either. Croatia has only a very small navy, but harassing OPFOR supply ships is what it probably could do best. Italy on the other hand has both a sizeable navy and could easily block the Adriatic Sea. So, unless the USSR dominates directly or through proxies the Balkan coastline and has - likely literally - nuked the Italian Eastern coastline, I don't see a chance for the Soviets still holding Munich. They simply wouldn't have the hinterland to do it.

They might have fallen back to Hungary, especially if a Quisling rules there, and occupy parts of the Balkan, but they would likely be far from controlling the former Yugoslavian countries. An alliance with Serbia might still be plausible, though, given that historically Russia was moderate to Milosevic's Serbia, despite taking part in actions against Serbia during the Kosovo War.
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Re: Timeline question

Thu 11 Aug 2022, 19:41

Thanks Ursus - that's a quality analysis. Here's my own, based upon what we know from 4e canon, assuming NATO stayed together (which FL seems to have indicated that they did). I also believe Yugoslavia would have fallen apart, as FL's canon largely stays similar to reality at least up until 94 or so.

We can say with a strong likelihood that the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania are all likely western aligned, hence them being happy with US troops being brought in to be stationed there. Austria in this timeline would have been likely to attempt neutrality given the circumstances, at least up until Soviet tanks started rushing through it. In order for the match up to be anywhere close to a fair fight between the Soviets and NATO, Serbia would have had to come out of the Yugoslav Wars at least relatively intact, and given Milosevic's relationship with Russia, I find it highly likely that a reinvigorated USSR would have done what they could to support him, particularly from 1996 onward (right after the end of the Bosnian War as the Soviets were really ramping up themselves). I also believe Bulgaria would be on the "REDFOR" side of the war.

As a result, I think the likeliest timeline is that the Soviets cross the border into Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania shortly after their ground forces meet the US in Poland for the first time. They'd attempt to neutralize Romania as quickly as possible based upon Romania's larger military threat and their proximity to Soviet allies, and then push hard into the Pannonian Basin from multiple directions - I imagine that's where the majority of the fighting in the southern front would take place, and Budapest would be front and center in the engagement, perhaps even the anchor of NATO lines. Given 4e's timeline, we know that the Soviets end up getting pushed back pretty steadily before throwing nukes around, and then shortly afterward they push hard forward again, and that's when they're able to take southern Germany.

With that all in mind, I imagine that either the Soviet forces in the Balkans region didn't get hit as hard by the west's nuclear counterstrike, or that they somehow managed to get heavily reinforced, or some combination of both. FL's canon never mentions what happens to the cities in southern Germany, but it's a pretty big open question, since that Soviet push indicates that they opened a fairly large north/south corridor between the Alps and the Carpathian mountain ranges. As for the US V Corps, I think that the V, and likely the VII Corps, were probably the units deployed to the 4 aforementioned nations. When the Soviets pushed hard into southern Germany late in the war, it exposed the V Corp's flank. Then eventually when Operation Reset takes place, the V try to push Eastward, but they still have this corridor behind them and so they retreat to close it off. That would leave a bunch of Soviets trapped behind the lines in southern Germany, which would also make for some awesome adventuring.
 
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Ursus Maior
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Re: Timeline question

Wed 17 Aug 2022, 23:52

Thanks Ursus - that's a quality analysis. Here's my own, based upon what we know from 4e canon, assuming NATO stayed together (which FL seems to have indicated that they did). I also believe Yugoslavia would have fallen apart, as FL's canon largely stays similar to reality at least up until 94 or so.
Thanks, that's kind to read. I would go so far and say that the timeline stays more or less intact regarding the break-up of Yugoslavia until the end of 1995. While "Vladimir Kryuchkov holds a speech about the “illegal” exit from the Soviet Union by the Baltic States, and how this was a CIA plot to weaken the Soviet Union" (RM p. 6), nothing at all is said about the Balkans at all....
[...]In order for the match up to be anywhere close to a fair fight between the Soviets and NATO, Serbia would have had to come out of the Yugoslav Wars at least relatively intact, and given Milosevic's relationship with Russia, I find it highly likely that a reinvigorated USSR would have done what they could to support him, particularly from 1996 onward (right after the end of the Bosnian War as the Soviets were really ramping up themselves).
In fact, it might have been the support for Croats and Bosniaks by "Western nations" that brings Kryuchkov and Milošević so close together that rump Yugoslavia (aka "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", de facto Serbia and Montenegro) allies with the USSR. Maybe that alliance even gets formalized somehow, but we hear nothing of that in the books so far of course.
We can say with a strong likelihood that the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania are all likely western aligned, hence them being happy with US troops being brought in to be stationed there. Austria in this timeline would have been likely to attempt neutrality given the circumstances, at least up until Soviet tanks started rushing through it. [...] I also believe Bulgaria would be on the "REDFOR" side of the war.I also believe Bulgaria would be on the "REDFOR" side of the war.
Hm, I see what you're doing there, I guess. The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the rebranded communist party, historically wins the elections in 1995 and remains in power until 1997. However, Bulgaria didn't join NATO in 1997, and neither did Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, all of which only joined in 2004. These countries simply weren't ready by 1997 to become full members, but participated in different programs of NATO, most prominently "Partnership for Peace".

Bulgaria's anti-communist party "Union of Democratic Forces" (SDS in Bulgarian) wrought power from the post-communist BSP in 1991. However, transfer to capitalism was colossally painful with mass-unemployment etc. Hence BSP retook power in 1995. With a resurgent USSR, this might open the door to more cordial relations between Kryuchkov and Bulgaria's Videnov Government. Historically, hyperinflation and economic collapse couldn't be stopped, but since Kryuchkov seems to have wielded a cornucopia of petro-rubels, he might just have helped Videnov out, basically buying an ally. A deal offering money and food for barracks and allegiance might seem like the right thing to sign for Videnov.

Romania is a different beast altogether. Much like Bulgaria, Romania's economy is in shambles long before the fall of communism in 1989/1990. However, while a broad coalition from center-left to right parties, supported by an even wider array of parties (from nationalists to post-communists) rules from 1991 onward, Emil Constantinescu of the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR) won the second round of the 1996 Romanian presidential elections by a comfortably. Thus, Romania is on a path away from Kryuchkov from the year on he starts his reconquest of the Baltics. In fact, it might be the USSR allying with Bulgaria and Serbian Yugoslavia that drives Romania further into the West's fold. Neither of these nations wields a credible military force by 1996 or 1997 and there is hardly any time for either the USSR or NATO to do anything about that. While the Soviets might use Bulgarians as cannon fodder, NATO is unlikely to do so, hoping that war won't break out and maybe delivering a few small weapon caches, once war seems imminent. A bit like the USA did during the winter of 2021 with Ukraine.

Hence, Romania remains a largely undefended part of Southeastern Europe, ready to be taken by Soviet and maybe Bulgarian token forces early on. This gives the Soviets a firm grip on the Western Black Sea and secures their flank for the big push into Hungary and Slovakia. Militarily, Hungary looks better than Romania and Bulgaria in 1997, but not by a lot. Also, with Ukraine having remained a part of the USSR, its Transcarpathian region allows for a direct access into Slovakia and Hungary, without having to fight across the Carpathian ranges first.

An initial push into Slovakia would only need to secure Košice in order to secure a larger foothold and open a northern front against Hungary, with more forceful pushes into central Slovakia and towards Bratislava being optional at that stage. Fighting in Hungary would be severe, I'd imagine, but being able to push from Novi Sad (FYR/Serbia), Uzhorod (USSR/Ukraine) and later Košice (Slovakia) and Oradea (Romania) towards Budapest, would put Hungary into a pretty impossible situation quite rapidly.

Yes, NATO would be obliged to defend its ally, but by 1997 no NATO-forces were assigned there. What's worse is that getting there could only be achieved along four paths:
  • Through Croatia, a NATO-oriented country, but not a member, so coercion from the USSR might prove fruitful. While Croatia would be close to forces of NATO countries in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR), these forces would a) already have a mission (stabilizing Bosnia and Herzegovina) and b) likely suffer from harassing attacks from pro-Serbian or (worse) Soviet forces. Also, SFOR units would need to cross into Croatia and then move further into Hungary.
  • Through Slovenia, which, again isn't a NATO member in 1997 and could only be used as a hub for forces arriving from Bosnia and Herzegovina (for problems, see above) or Italy. That's a long way to go to reinforce Hungary.
  • Through Austria, which would still be a neutral country that would do everything not to get sucked into the conflict, including closing its borders after being threatened by the Soviets.
  • Through Slovakia, which would be itself a country torn by war.
All in all, sending forces to relief Hungary seems most likely through Slovenia, coming from Italy. The Italian infrastructure is very well equipped to handle massed concentrations of military forces, especially in the North with harbors, airports and many large highways and freeways. Also, Slovenia is among the better equipped countries of former Yugoslavia, not having endured a long civil war and having had 5 years to receive and allocate funds by European nations as well as the USA.
With that all in mind, I imagine that either the Soviet forces in the Balkans region didn't get hit as hard by the west's nuclear counterstrike, or that they somehow managed to get heavily reinforced, or some combination of both.
All in all, I'd go with the first option as it creates the least fuss. The Balkans - stretching from Slovenia to Romania - are the soft underbelly of free Europe and would be a highly problematic theater for NATO in that scenario. Not only would they clearly be dominated by the Soviets and their allies, numerous countries oriented towards NATO would also be at risk of being damaged in the process, practically making them hostages and putting NATO into a vicious bind. Additionally, NATO forces of SFOR would be on the frontline of an asymmetric campaign of attrition pretty much from day one (or before that even) and could be exposed to attacks by regular Yugoslavian/Serbian and Soviet forces, too. While they likely could withdraw to Croatia or even into Hungary, that would expose Croatia to Soviet repercussions and/or leave the Balkans completely undefended.

Croatia, in fact, would be the keystone to the Balkans theater to NATO (and hence the USSR). It's the only medium-sized (though just barely) nation with a working economy alligned towards NATO. It's army is, while equipped sub-par, combat experienced and it offers harbors, airfields and - to some degree - roads. NATO absolutely would have to make a stand there, before even being able to hope going into a counteroffensive in the Pannonian Basin (aka Hungary). While Soviet forces attacking Slovakia could be stopped, in theory, before reaching Bratislava, I think that the outlook for Budapest would be much bleaker. Major engagements in former Yugoslavian republics west of Sarajevo would certainly be a problem to reinforce Hungary along the Italian-Slovenian-Croatian (Zagreb!) axis.

I agree with your ideas on US V and VII corps in general. I don't think, though, that US forces would have been deployed to Romania, simply because Romania would have fallen to quickly to be saved. However, in 1992 VII was inactivated and I would assume reactivating it could have been the American contribution of supporting NATO's initial force deployment to Italy in an attempt to relief Hungary from the Southwest. I think, with the Italians and US VII Corps plowing through Slovenia and Croatia in order to reach Hungary, Croatia would have been saved from any real threats to occupy Zagreb. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina would certainly become a war-torn country (again) with NATO securing the Western part of the country and SFOR becoming a regional command tasked with anti-partisan warfare. Several units would rotate out, most notably all forces needed by their countries of origin along NORTHAG and CENTAG, leaving SFOR severely diminshed.

Italian forces would then keep guarding the Balkan approaches (Adriatic Sea, Slovenia, Croatia) into Hungary, freeing up US VII Corps to be thrown into the Hungarian meat-grinder. The ultimate goal would be to link VII Corps with V Corps coming from Germany through the Czech Republic, but - alas! - the balloon goes up on the nuclear issue and it all goes to pieces. After the dust settles, Croatia is still in NATO's hands, Bosnia and Herzegovina is still a killing field, Hungary and Slovakia are still contested and Southeastern Germany, while liberated, is in ruins.

Again, I cannot see a reason for Operation Reset forces to simply accept Soviet forces so deep behind their lines, it's just strategically unsound. However, there is still the case of pseudo-neutral Austria. With the Czech Republic and Slovakia being under Soviet attack, the government in Vienna could have been coerced to allow for Soviet forces to transit into Germany: "Let us pass or be vanquished", was always the choice Austrians dreaded the most, knowing fully well that their army was a joke to the Soviet juggernaut.

If the Soviets make a reasonable offer, i. e. a simple transit route along the highways connecting Budapest-Bratislava-Vienna-Braunau/Salzburg-Munich, but spare the country South of that axis, the Austrian government might have yielded. That would allow the Soviets to gain the necessary access into Southern Germany, at least for a limited strike, hoping to knock out Germany early in the war. With Austria under (albeit limited) Soviet influence, Soviet troops could still be encountered in Bavaria in very limited number (think: reconnaissance forces and spetsnaz), without creating the necessity for a large contingent of Soviet forces behind NATO lines.

Also, if Austria got compromised by Soviet forces, this would bring a new player into the war: Switzerland had planned to occupy the Western-most Austrian province of Vorarlberg (southeast of Lake Constance) in order to push out its own Eastern-most defense perimeters, allowing to battle the invaders on Austrian soil instead of inside the Swiss underbelly. That would have put Swiss Mirage III and F-5 Tiger II into striking distance of Soviet forces in Austria or Bavaria; talking about role-playing opportunities.
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Heffe
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Re: Timeline question

Thu 18 Aug 2022, 21:07

This is all really excellent - thanks again for taking the time to share your knowledge on the topic. Regarding Bulgaria, yes, I kind of see them as being a REDFOR necessity, particularly because so far as we know, based upon comments allegedly made by FL, that NATO is fairly intact at least up through '94. Which means any Soviet attack down through the Balkans is going to need some support if it wants to stand any kind of chance, if not only to help provide a protected flank against Greece. Having the VII join in through the Italy->Slovenia->Croatia route with the Italians, rather than having them join into Romania, is a really interesting thought that I'll have to ruminate on.

I'm curious to know what you think about the following:
  • 1. My understanding is that Romania around the turn of the decade had somewhere in the neighborhood of 16 Army divisions or so. That seems like a fairly large standing army, despite their poor training and equipment. Enough to at least give the USSR some pause, particularly if backed up by the US VII Corps.
    2. The 4e canon timeline suggests a push up through Hungary/Austria into Bavaria - basically threading between the eastern Alps and the Carpathians. Wouldn't it be possible for that to happen to happen through western Slovakia, forcing some western units north and east?
As for Bavaria itself, this is why I asked the question of FL on this thread - since we don't really know what happens there. Completely agreed that NATO and the west wouldn't be comfortable just leaving 3 major south German cities in Soviet hands behind the front lines, but if that is happening, it tells us a ton about how the war in the Balkans progressed.

Finally, if you're interested, I'd love to have you read through what I've built out for the region's "expanded canon" timeline and provide your thoughts (please keep in mind this is still very much a draft):

The Balkan Front
1997
In Europe, Kryuchkov sets the stage for and then invades Poland with the units of the former Soviet Group of Forces in Germany (GSFG). This is followed by a NATO bombing campaign to stem the attacking Soviet army, which in turn leads to the Soviet bombing of NATO bases throughout Europe. Newly elected American President Harvey West sends units to the Balkans in an attempt to deter Kryuchkov from expanding the war, which has an opposite effect. Specifically, West sends elements of the US V Corps to the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. The four western-friendly nations welcome the American support. Romania in particular is soon identified as a problem by Soviet military leadership, as even though it was designed to be somewhat defensively aligned, the large Romanian Army represents a significant risk to the Soviet southern flank.

A few days after June 6th as American and Soviet forces meet on the ground for the first time in Poland, the USSR invades en masse across the borders of Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. The Soviets send the following units into eastern Hungary and Slovakia – the Soviet Southern Group of Forces, the 8th Tank Army, the 28th Army Corps, and the 13th and 38th Combined Arms Armies, backed up by the 14th Air Army. Kryuchkov’s goal is for these units to gain and hold the north-eastern portions of the Pannonian Basin until supporting units can arrive from the south, trusting in their numbers and superior equipment to be able to hold out against the NATO forces there.

The Soviet force which crosses the border into Romania is even larger, consisting of the 6th Tank Army, the 1st and 14th Guards Combined Arms Armies, and the 32nd and 64th Army Corps. These units are accompanied by the 5th and 17th Air Armies, as well as elements of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and Soviet Airborne troops. The objective for this larger force is to overwhelm the Romanians with sheer volume of men and equipment. The hope being that, within the first 72 hours, they could push south through eastern Romania to reach the Danube and link up with friendly Bulgarian forces. They would then turn west, squeezing any remaining BLUFOR forces between the Carpathian Mountains in the north and the Danube to the south, all while Bulgaria would hold the southern flank against Greece. Finally, they would cross the Danube at Gura Văii and enter Serbia, where they would turn north and advance into the Pannonian Basin from the south, eventually linking up with the still-in-place Soviet formations there. Soviet commanders assured Kryuchkov that the whole operation would take no more than a month.

Almost immediately, the Soviet plan hits significant obstacles in Romania, as resistance turns out to be more resilient than anticipated. Backed up by independent elements of the US Army, the Romanians cause the much larger Soviet force to stall out on its run to the Danube. Despite Soviet naval infantry landings along the coast attempting to clear the way, the Romanian military had been preparing for just such an eventuality and had dug in deep. What should have taken only 3 days ends up requiring 3 weeks of costly advances. It then takes the Soviets an additional two months of brutal fighting to finally push east to the Serbian border. While the Romanian and American units are savaged, many of them simply retreat into the more mountainous terrain of the Carpathians, where they proceeded to initiate a series of guerrilla campaigns against the invaders. When the Soviet southern force finally reaches Serbia (with only 4 divisions not bogged down by the fighting), they are met with smiles and welcome arms by the Yugoslav Army.

In Serbia, Milošević uses the arrival of the Soviets as a stepping off point – and first sends the Yugoslav Army into Kosovo, where it brutally puts down the growing rebels of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Milošević then turns his interest toward Bosnia, and with the Soviets and Bulgarians now covering his flanks, launches a full out assault. The remaining members of Republika Srpska and other Bosnian Serbs join in the fray, and the long-besieged city of Sarajevo quickly falls to the now much-larger Serbian forces.

1998
The first few months of the new year show Milošević and the Yugoslav Army making great strides in consolidating their gains throughout Bosnia. While the local populace attempts to fight back as they’re able, the renewed ethnic cleansing of Muslims and Bosnian Croats leads hundreds of thousands to flee north or westward into Croatia. It isn’t long before the Yugoslav Army pursues them in attacking Croatia as well, with Milošević trying to liberate those Croatian Serbs that he sees as living under hostile and illegal regimes.

Meanwhile, the Soviet advance, with fresh reinforcements from the east as Soviet control of Romania hardens, continues to push north into Hungary and Slovakia, where on January 18th, it finally manages to link up with the Soviet units holding the line there. The Hungarians, the US V Corps, along with the recently arriving French 2nd Corps, draw a line in the sand, extending from Zagreb to Budapest to Košice in Slovakia, and make their stand. The Battle of Budapest lasts months, until finally the entrance of the Italian 3rd and 5th Corps into the conflict on the side of NATO forces breaks the stalemate on the part of the west. The Soviet forces execute a fighting retreat back to Serbia in the south and Hungary’s eastern borders. Then, the nuclear weapons begin to fall. At first hitting BLUFOR units in southern Hungary, northern Serbia, and Slovakia, they obliterate most of the fresh Italian units, which are caught in tight formation in preparation for a new offensive. It’s not long before the American nuclear response starts to land on Soviet units in Serbia, Romania, and Ukraine.

Just as Milošević and the Yugoslav Army are starting to make progress against Croatia in their genocidal advance, more US weapons fall upon his forces as well as his industrial base back in Serbia proper, bringing the attack to a sudden and fiery halt. Bulgaria and Greece, and the other Balkan nations soon suffer similar fates, as the world superpowers begin to target secondary and tertiary enemy military and industrial targets.

With NATO still reeling from the nuclear onslaught, Kryuchkov attempts a last desperate gambit to break the stalemate across the fronts in the Balkans and in Poland – he orders in reserve forces from Turkestan and the Ural military districts, which he had been slowly moving into position in eastern Serbia. The 32nd Combined Arms Army, as well as the 33rd Army Corps and mobilization only units from the Soviet Ural Military District join the regrouping Soviets just beyond the Hungarian border. Despite their antiquated equipment, the fresh offensive punches straight north through the Budapest Line; much of the west’s military strength too exhausted to put up a dedicated resistance against the full-strength reserves. The Soviet advance enters the rear of NATO’s forces in what comes to be known as the Czechian Pocket, and continues to push into south-eastern Germany before another wave of tactical nuclear weapons and German defensive forces put a stop to them. All forces in the region buckle down into cantonment when the cold of winter sets in.

1999
As winter thaws into spring, the Balkans are, in customary fashion, hit hard with starvation and suffering. Disease in particular, runs rampant throughout most Balkan nations, sparing neither NATO nor Soviet forces. The Soviets however, receive the lion’s share, as they aren’t as well supplied with medicine and antibiotics. Thus, a number of Soviet units in the region disintegrate, the result of Cholera and outbreaks of the Bubonic Plague. Some units turn into bands of well-equipped marauders, while others change sides entirely. The same is true of some BLUFOR units in the region, though fewer units join the Soviets.

Hungary and northern Serbia, being the nations to bore the bulk of the fighting in the region, are deeply scarred. The Great Hungarian Plain is now pockmarked with thousands of dead and rusting tanks, punctuated by nuclear impact craters. The surrounding nations all bare their own wounds however, the result of a close brush with nuclear annihilation. Northern Serbia is an irradiated wasteland, being hit by first Soviet, and then western weapons. The south of the country however, away from industrial and military centers, is still fairly intact.

As the year progresses, BLUFOR units in the Czech Republic slowly try to close the Soviet corridor between the Austrian Alps and the Carpathian Mountains. In Slovakia, the US V Corps stays in cantonment through most of the year, and attempts to recruit amongst the locals in order to refill its tattered ranks.

2000
In the turn of the millennium, Serbia and the Balkans are similar to Poland in the north. There are pockets of relative safety, but much of the landscape is a dead or dying battlefield. Rusted military hulks, shattered trench networks, and mud, resemble visions of the Great War that happened a century earlier.

In early April, word starts to come in of a new western operation, the first in over a year. Operation Reset, they say, will see the Soviets expelled from Southern Germany and pushed clean out of the region all the way back to Ukraine. While the V initially tries to push east, stiff resistance causes it to pull back into Slovakia with the hopes of assisting existing units there with closing Soviet access into the Czechian Pocket.
Last edited by Heffe on Tue 30 Aug 2022, 00:33, edited 1 time in total.
 
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Ursus Maior
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Re: Timeline question

Mon 29 Aug 2022, 17:15

This is all really excellent - thanks again for taking the time to share your knowledge on the topic. Regarding Bulgaria, yes, I kind of see them as being a REDFOR necessity, particularly because so far as we know, based upon comments allegedly made by FL, that NATO is fairly intact at least up through '94. Which means any Soviet attack down through the Balkans is going to need some support if it wants to stand any kind of chance, if not only to help provide a protected flank against Greece. Having the VII join in through the Italy->Slovenia->Croatia route with the Italians, rather than having them join into Romania, is a really interesting thought that I'll have to ruminate on.

I'm curious to know what you think about the following:
  • 1. My understanding is that Romania around the turn of the decade had somewhere in the neighborhood of 16 Army divisions or so. That seems like a fairly large standing army, despite their poor training and equipment. Enough to at least give the USSR some pause, particularly if backed up by the US VII Corps.
    2. The 4e canon timeline suggests a push up through Hungary/Austria into Bavaria - basically threading between the eastern Alps and the Carpathians. Wouldn't it be possible for that to happen to happen through western Slovakia, forcing some western units north and east?
As for Bavaria itself, this is why I asked the question of FL on this thread - since we don't really know what happens there. Completely agreed that NATO and the west wouldn't be comfortable just leaving 3 major south German cities in Soviet hands behind the front lines, but if that is happening, it tells us a ton about how the war in the Balkans progressed.

Finally, if you're interested, I'd love to have you read through what I've built out for the region's "expanded canon" timeline and provide your thoughts (please keep in mind this is still very much a draft):
Hi there, I'd be happy to stick my head into your non-canonic background ideas a bit more, but will do that later. First, I'd like to share some thoughts on the other issues you brought up. I'll do that in to order presented, 1) Romania at the beginning of hostilities in 1997, 2) regarding the possibility of the Soviets pushing through western Slovakia to enter Bavaria and 3) bringing all of this together into something I'd like to start calling the "Danubian Theater of Operations" (DanTO), because the Danube river is the central geographical feature of South-Eastern Europe and the way its surrounding topography works determines what operations need to be undertaken given the political setup.

For this thread I mainly looked at open maps, including a topographical map from this link: https://en-gb.topographic-map.com/maps/s5d7/Europe/

I set the map layer to "CyclOSM" to gain maximum information input: cities, towns, rivers and borders.

1) The status of the Romanian Armed Forces in 1997
Historically, Warsaw Pact forces went from bad to worse the more South-East one looked. It's certainly debatable why this was the case, but in any case the Hungarian armed forces was never trusted by the Soviets after the coup of 1956 and in fact the Hungarian armed forces never recovered from being crushed by the Soviets in 1956. It's important to remember that this destruction was not so much one of physical annihilation of material, but of dismembering the leadership by prosecution and KGB interrogation. However, Hungarian material could be regarded as better than that of Bulgaria and Hungary was a loyal member of the Warsaw Pact, unlike Romania.

Bulgarian armed forces were the least modern of the Warsaw Pact still actively fielding T-34/85 in 1989 and with very little armored infantry in comparison to other Pact armies: the vast majority of motorized rifle units fielded only BTR-60 and MT-LB, just 31 BMP-1 were active in 1989 (cf. Military Balance 1990). However, more than 300 early production T-72 tanks formed the core of Bulgarian mechanized divisions.

Romania, on the other hand, had left the Pact in all but name after 1968 and had already signaled to do so after the Cuba Crisis. During the 1970s and 1980s Romania also conducted several modernization programs for its aging fleet of T-55 tanks and started producing a homemade variant of the BMP-1 called the MLI-84. Nonetheless, Romania also fielded 1,060 T-34/85, 326 SU-76, 84 SU-100 and 20 ISU-152 or World War Two vintage in 1990.

All of these ancient war-machines had been discarded by 1996 however, except for 66 SU-100. And while no new T-72 had been bought (only 30 were available), more than 400 upgraded T-55 were available in addition to 1,255 earlier production models. However, this being the first tier of weapons, Romania could not hope to be even remotely on par with any aggressor other than Bulgaria, which had conducted a similar clean-up, while also adding more modern material: active forces included 433 T-72, some 1,042 T-55, around 100 BMP-1 plus 114 home-grown BMP-23 (which swapped the 73 mm low-pressure gun for a 23 mm autocannon). Both nations retained large active conscription forces with a huge reserve structure, but Romania's land forces were more than twice the size of Bulgaria's, even adding active forces during the 1990s (1990: 163,000 active troops, 1996: 226,950). This meant Bulgaria had far fewer maneuver forces available and was far more focused on guarding its own territory. Romania indeed retained (on paper that is) large maneuvering forces, 8 corps in total, but was also far more vulnerable: With Soviet Ukraine in the North and on both sides of the Carpathian Mountains, fragile Moldova (an unclear issue in FL's T2K timeline) in the East, a small, open coast line in the Southeast and Bulgaria in the South, Romania had to potentially endure aggression from three sides.

In case Serbia would join a Bulgarian-Soviet alliance as we speculated, the Southwest of Romania would also be endangered, allowing for a push into the low-lying heartland of Carpathian Romania not guarded by the shield that the Carpathian Mountain range naturally forms (partially) against a Soviet-Bulgarian attack from the three aforementioned sides. The only natural defense Romania has left then is the Danube river, which makes defense of the river basin vital. This includes guarding the harbor city of Constanța and its surrounding flatlands - the Danube estuary - up North to Tulcea where Romania meets the borders of Ukraine and Moldova in the Danube delta. Constanța, unfortunately (for Romanian defenders) is situated "below" the Danube, making an attack from Bulgarian Varna easier, as Constanța is not shielded by the Danube against Bulgarian aggression.

Thus, Romania forces need to defend a much longer border against a joint Bulgarian-Serbian-Soviet aggression with its natural barriers partially compromised by the political situation of such a scenario like we established earlier: Transcarpathian Ukraine allows easy access into Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, allowing to bypass the Carpathians to some extant, and with Moldova likely reintegrated into the USSR by 1996 at the latest and Bulgaria a Soviet ally, the Danube is compromised as a defensive line in Eastern Romania, allowing the Soviets to neutralize the Romanian navy at Constanța and take Galați, the Romanian city on the Danube that connects Bucharest with Moldova. Serbia, finally, endangers Southwestern Romania at the Iron Gates of the Danube: At best, the Serbians manage to take a bridge or to cross the Danube on their own. At worst, Serbian forces tie down Romanian divisions badly needed elsewhere.

With its army large, but outdated, things don't look good for Romania in such a scenario. I would assume US VII Corps never makes it to Romania, as the Black Sea is completely dominated by the Soviet navy, 25 years ago the Moskva would still have been a formidable ship at the center of a much bigger fleet, denying Black Sea amphibious access of the USN to Romania. Pushing through Bulgaria via Greece and Turkish Thrace might be possible, but would be very slow: The Greek highways weren't well suited to such an operation and neither were the Turkish, much less were the Bulgarian roads. Also, a joint Greco-Turkish invasion of Bulgaria would be a nightmare to coordinate, given the nature of relations both countries enjoy. Finally, pushing through the Balkans would mean VII Corps would have to go through Serbia in force or follow the Danube on the Hungarian side, likely coming under fire from Soviet (air) forces in the North, themselves attacking Hungary at the time, and Serbian air force attacks from the South. Plowing down the Danube this way, VII Corps would suffer heavy attrition rapidly.
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Re: Timeline question

Mon 29 Aug 2022, 17:16

2) On the Possibility of a Soviet Push into Bavaria
The Bavarian-Austrian border is 815.9 km long from the shared border with the Czech Republic in the Northeast to Lake Constance in the Southwest. However, only a very narrow strip is easily accessible: between Salzburg and the Alps in the South and the Lipno Reservoir, an artificial lake with a hydroelectric powerplant, bordering the Bohemian Forest and the Bohemian Massif beyond the border is less than 120 km of easily accessible area. To the North, and especially the South, it's mountains and forests. So any push into Bavaria from the East best follows the Danube, essentially moving it "up" from Upper Austria into Lower Bavaria. While crossing the Austrian Alps from Graz in a northwestern direction to Salzburg is possible, thanks to the well-developed Austrian freeway (autobahn) network is certainly possible, it's much harder to force a way through the alps than it might look on paper.

Essentially, an autobahn connection exists between Vienna and Passau (the A1; a train connection follows largely the same route), as does a connection from Slovenia to Salzburg on the German border via Villach (A10 in Austria), but we established already that a Soviet push through Slovenia would be unlikely and meet the stiffest possible resistance by the Slovenes and (likely) NATO forces. Any invader pushing into Austria from Hungary wanting to drive towards Bavaria would be hard-pressed to find a second major route of advance besides the Danube basing, however: While the route from Lake Balaton to Graz is fairly open and pushing northwest towards Liezen means following the A9 autobahn and its auxiliary, the A113, the buck stops there at Liezen. From there to Salzburg and into Upper Bavaria, one must go around the mountains around Bad Ischl and Halstatt. The best road to be found is still the A9, but it detours to the North here, meating the A1 and A8 South of the city of Wels and thus cutting into traffic coming from Vienna and going to Salzburg. Logistically this means there is no good connection here but going around the moutains of Halstatt in the South would mean only lesser roads are available.

So, if NATO and the Slovenes manage to fend of the Soviets from breaking through Slovenia, Soviet forces cannot create a second main route of advance through Austria. They will only be able to push through the Donau valley in full force, reducing secondary advances to an auxiliary role, which makes them easier to fend off. And while the Austrian army was ill-equipped to fight off first tier Soviet forces in the 1980s, some modernization occurred during the 1990s. Also, a push through Hungary would not be done by first tier Soviet forces, those would be used in Poland and (possibly) the Czech Republic. The Austrians also specialized on small-unit tactics, ambushes and large territorial forces supported by armored units. So, while the Austrian army isn't exactly the best in the world, they're no pushovers either. Delaying the Soviets until the war is decided elsewhere was basically how they trained to fight.

So, the push through the Danube valley is a tough sell for a 1990s World War Three, essentially, because the Hungarian, Czech and Slovakian armies weren't available for the Soviets and pushing into Germany and beyond territory now meant going through those countries first.

Alas, the Soviet’s manage to pull it off. Not sure how they do it, more on that later, but it sure will not be pretty for anyone involved, including the Soviets themselves. I think, they over-extended there and will show in the months after they reached Leipzig (not a Bavarian city, by the way, it’s in Northern Saxony, which makes it even weirder), Nuremberg and Munich.

Remember, NATO cannot be beaten, unless the Americans are hindered to bring their industrial and personnel power into the greater European theater of war. This is the lesson learned from both World Wars before: America must not be able to project its enormous power into Europe. The Cold War Gone Hot way of the 1970s to 1980s in order to keep them out was to occupy European harbors and ports East of France (i. e. the Rhine river) before convoys from the US with fresh divisions made it there. During the 1980s, that meant pushing through Central Europe towards the Rhine and Rotterdam within less than a week. Had that been accomplished, France would have been offered a side-deal: end the war and be spared.

In Southern Europe, a similar push would have been necessary towards the harbors and ports of Northern Italy and Greece. Turkish harbors in Thrace were to vulnerable, but Greek roads were also very weak and the whole soft underbelly of Europe was not deemed an essential region. So cutting the Americans off from Genoa would likely have sufficed. The old Southern Group of Forces of the Soviet Army in Hungary was earmarked for a push towards Yugoslavia and Italy, not Germany; that was the job of the Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia. Hence the Balkans became so important in NATO defense thinking. Yugoslavia benefited from these circumstances during the late Cold War. Western nations needed Yugoslavia to keep its course against the USSR, but the USSR needed to go through Yugoslavia, either as an ally or in full force. With the break-up of Yugoslavia the game was reshuffled. The western successor nations were inclined towards NATO, but Serbia drifted towards Russia (historically) and likely the USSR in FL's T2K.

All these colossal actions, the whole European theater of a World War, made only sense, if the Soviets felt they needed to proactively take over Europe, before the Transatlantic Alliance could permanently diminish Soviet exertion of power over its own empire. The key is and always was the German industrial might and its huge population: Denying the Germans to the West meant – in the eyes of the Soviets – tipping the European continent in favor of the USSR. So they needed to conquer all of Germany, but they needed to take caution not to bite off too much of the rest, else they would suffocate like Nazi Germany did.

Gaining the prize that is Germany, but not suffocating on the rest, means limiting the pushes into Europe. And that’s another aspect of getting allies: The Soviets needed them to subdue the rest of Europe. I think the conservative planners in the Kremlin would prevail and plan for a revived Central Group of Forces to go through the Czech Republic and into Germany. This is the second venue of attack after Poland.

This would also mean that there would be less forces available to push into Slovakia, but the country is of subordinate importance anyway. The Czechs were in possession of most industrial installations anyway, so their Republic was more important. Slovakia would be a country to go through in order to get somewhere and that somewhere is Hungary, which – to its ill fortune – is just in the way for the Soviets to knock out Northern Italy and the port of Genoa.

So, this means that the new Southern Group of Forces would now have to push through Hungary first and then through former Yugoslavia. At the same time a new iteration of the Central Group of Forces would have to push divert some forces to knock out Austria, so that NATO couldn’t use Austria as a staging ground to relieve the Balkans and Italy.

All in all, that's a far tougher feat for both groups to accomplish than back when they were already at the German and Austrian border. This is, why I think an alliance with Serbia and Bulgaria would be imperative for the Soviets even to think they can pull off something like a knock-out blow against NATO. The US might have lost troops to the peace dividend, yes, but they outfitted an expeditionary army from scratch twice already in the last century. This time, it would be far easier for the US to do it: The material was still available, the soldiers still in reserve programs. Training new recruits would be quicker and could be accomplished within six months. With better preparation on part of the US, but more ground to cover for the Soviets, the Kremlin planners would be in dire need to come up with something that gave them an edge.

The second part has been much more convoluted that the first, but the answer is much more complex, too, since the question is not so much “can the Soviets push into Bavaria”, but “why would they” and “from where would they”. So, after preparing the ground, let me re-address the issue again: Would the Soviets push into Bavaria? Yes, absolutely. It’s necessary for the USSR to conquer all of Germany or otherwise deny NATO the German industrial capacities as well as deny the German masses to fight against the USSR. Remember, in 1990 the USSR has less than 300 million people, then it looses the Baltics. Germany has more than 80 million after its reunification and outpaces the USSR in industrial capacity by far. Germany, France, Italy, the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium – the core of “Western Europe” – combines a total of over 300 million people and has an industrial capacity several times that of the USSR. If the USSR knocks out Germany – and likely the Netherlands and Denmark in the process – Western Europe looses the edge.

So, all warfare needs to be aimed – ultimately – at Germany. This means that all other operations need to be swift, decisive and with as few Soviet losses as possible. The most important goal after Germany is knocking out the Southern route of reenforcing Europe, e. g. Italy. This generates the need to dominate the Balkans, generating the need to dominate Hungary and denying NATO open lines of communication through Austria. We’re already deep into mission creep here, generating three large operations (Hungary, Slovenia, Northern Italy) to support the German theater of war. All of these, by nature of the things, generate further operations, some of them larger, others smaller.

Securing the push into Hungary not necessarily means attacking Slovakia, it’s not yet a NATO country (nor is Hungary), but both countries would immediately apply for membership, as would the Czech Republic. Apparently NATO is more eager to get into the action in T2K than in any current conflicts, so the war spills over to Slovakia. The Soviets need to knock out Austria next, because their push through the Czech Republic fails. NATO pushes into Austria, too, to open a route to Italy, after Slovenia signals cooperation or applies for membership. Additionally, NATO forces in former Yugoslavia come under fire from pro-Serbian partisans. The Soviets then start actions against Romania, so NATO cannot endanger Ukraine from there, by going through Greek and Turkish Thrace into Bulgaria and then into Romania.

So, they push into Romania from multiple sides - Moldova, Bulgaria, Transcarpathian Ukraine, amphibious landing, airborne forces - in order to ensure Romania is subdues quickly. They don't need Romania to fall, which is why they don't plan for a lengthy occupation of even annexation. What they need is to shut Romania off from NATO, i. e. the Americans. So what happens after that?
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Re: Timeline question

Mon 29 Aug 2022, 17:16

3) The Danubian Theater of Operations
In FL’s T2K the whole European Theater of Operations is about regaining an empire. Historically, it would have been about denying the West (i. e. the USA) access into Europe and thus dominating Germany and Central Europe in order for the USSR to be the eternal empire on the continent. In T2K 4E the setup is decidedly not in favor of the Soviets. They were removed from the German border by several hundred kilometers. So they needed a cunning plan and a lot of help. At first, the Soviets only wanted to regain control of Poland, likely the Czech Republic as well as former member republics of the USSR in the Baltics plus maybe Moldova. But when the Americans came to the aid of Poland, their German staging grounds needed to be taken from them.

So, Soviet forces needed to push into Germany for good. There was no chance of making it “in eight days to the Rhine”, since they had to go all their former allied countries (including Eastern Germany) first. So they pushed into the Czech Republic with a new Central Group of Forces. The Soviets also massed forces to push into Hungary should NATO show signs of enforcing Europe through the Mediterranean.

NATO did show these signs and more.

Outfitting and readying VII Corps, US aimed at using Italy as a base to secure Southeastern Europe. Rumors of talks under way for Austria to either join NATO or let troops from Italy pass into Germany reached the Kremlin. At the same time, the newly founded the Spanish–Italian Landing Force (SILF) prepared to enter Croatia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina to relief NATO forces there serving as peacekeepers.

These preparations made the Soviets launch their invasion into Hungary and Romania with a supporting move into Slovakia. In the eyes of the Kremlin, NATO could not be allowed to open the Southern Front first. Hastily developed plans to neutralized Romania are executed and the Soviet steamroller moves across the Carpathians. The ultimate goal is to stop the US VII Corps from endangering Ukraine or supporting Germany via Austria. The Soviets manage to occupy most of Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, but never make it into Italy; not by a longshot. The Soviets enter Austria, however, denying VII Corps both opportunities: Supporting Germany and attacking Ukraine via Romania.

With the Czech Republic occupied and VII Corps not coming to the rescue, Soviet forces can pierce through the Bohemian and Bavarian forest into Bavaria and even manage to pull of a daring raid of airborne forces supported by limited mechanized forces into Saxony, eventually taking Leipzig. But then their invasion stalls. While the Soviets managed to deny NATO direly needed troops, they themselves over-extended. The Soviet army has used up all its reserves earmarked for future offensives, including those needed in Poland. NATO on the other hand hasn’t even mobilized fully.

And thus begins the NATO counter-offensive, which clears the Soviets out of Germany, the most important task of the war. However, Poland needs to be liberated almost completely as well, as does the Czech Republic. NATO reserves start to dwindle and when the job seems to be finally done, the Soviets start nuking everything and everyone.

The Danube Theater of Operations, essentially all of Europe Southeast of Bavaria, becomes an important secondary front during this and the subsequent phase of the war. Warfare here was less intense, circumventing many towns and cities, where possible, leaving infrastructure and fields intact. Thus, the lands from Austria to Romania become valuable targets for the next campaigns with material not yet used up and harvests to be distributed across Europe.

The fronts stabilize here, too, as they do in Poland and elsewhere, but the Danube and the countries along its see much action in the next years, mainly in smaller battles. Serbia is bombed in 1998 and 1999 by NATO to support the Kosovo Albanian people, who are pro-NATO, but the Soviet grip around Hungary and Romania remains firm. Bulgaria is attacked by Greek and Turkish forces relieving somewhat Romanian resistance, but in the end the Greeks and Turks lack the abilities to project their power deep into Bulgaria without help from the US. Thus, Romania cannot be liberated and most resistance there is reduced to partisan action.

Slovakia remains a mountainous hotbed for partisan action, too, but they cannot link up with Romanian partisans, since the Soviets control the Hungarian plains as well as both sides of the river Tisza, separating Slovakia from Romania. Austria is devastated and partly occupied by either side. While NATO forces occupy the roads through the Alps into Italy as well as the border with the Czech Republic, the Soviets control the entrance into the Hungarian plains. Also, Switzerland occupied Vorarlberg to make sure the Soviets do not enter into Swiss territory. A heated debate has engulfed Swiss politics, if or when to withdraw. Croatia, Slovenia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina are allied with or occupied by NATO, with pro-Serbian partisans still fighting the occupiers in their lands.

That’s all for today. I try to read the rest tomorrow and then think about it and hopefully reply. :)
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Re: Timeline question

Tue 30 Aug 2022, 00:52

I don't think we're too far separated at all in our thinking here. In the time since the last post, I ended up thinking some more about the VII Corps and pulled it out of Europe entirely, leaving only V Corps (and maybe some supporting divisions?) sending elements into Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. This would accelerate the Soviet's capturing of Romania (though it would still take them longer than they'd hope), as well as better allow the Soviets holding the eastern Hungarian Plain more time to hold out for reinforcements. The reason being is that there's a whole lot happening elsewhere in the world besides just in Europe, and I don't believe the US would abandon places like the Middle East. Given VII's experience in the Gulf War, there's also some pretext for them being elsewhere that fits nicely.

Mostly, I have the battle in SE Europe as being not quite as large as the battle in Poland, but still very significant. There's somewhere around 15 Soviet armies in the space, in addition to the Serbs and Bulgarians. For Bulgaria, I largely see them as forming a defensive bulwark against the Greeks. Much the same with the Serbs, but more limited as they'd also be attempting to resolve their issues in Bosnia and the Serbian areas of Croatia. In opposition would be the US V Corps, Romania, Hungary, Austria (but only later on during the war when the Soviets broke through NATO lines), and the Italians. I also added in some French troops to round out the NATO numbers and since the canon material mentions the French being pretty heavily engaged early on in the war.

Turkey, surprisingly, I don't see as much of a threat in Thrace. Turkey would only have the Turkish 1st Army remaining, as they'd already be under attack from the east by the Soviet High Command of the Southern Direction, in addition to what would most likely be some elements from Iran. Between the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the forces in the Caucuses, Turkey would be looking to take a much more defensive strategy in Thrace, especially with Istanbul very possibly getting a nuke or two partway through the war.

Lastly, given what we know from FL and what we know of the existing forces in Europe, there's still a lot that's happened that we simply don't know about. For example, we know virtually nothing of what's happening in Northern Poland and much of Germany. I have at least a whole German army (maybe 2) that's essentially unspoken for in canon, along with multiple Soviet armies in Belarus. That doesn't even go into whatever the hell happened in Finland and why so few forces are left in Sweden. I'm leaving all of this well enough alone in the vague hope that FL will cover some of it in their upcoming Operation Reset module.

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