As to Swedish foreign policy, Vader, I am curious as to what the reports got wrong. I'm not at all well-versed in the topic, but what I read in the reports didn't send up any obvious red flags. Please, enlighten me.
Thank you for asking, and I'll do my best!
We have here in Sweden a research project named FoKK,
Försvaret och det Kalla Kriget ("The Defence and the Cold War"). It was started in 2002, and is since 2012 tied to the Department of History of Stockholm University, with support from the country's military academies and various civilian and private institutes and foundations. The people running it are mainly a bunch of high-ranking academics and military personnel; professors, colonels, and others of similar ilk. The project publishes reports illuminating aspects of Sweden's defence during the Cold War; largely with a focus on documenting testimonies from those actually involved at the time.
According to FoKK 12
Det sovjetiska hotet mot Sverige under det kalla kriget ("The Soviet Threat Against Sweden During the Cold War"), a paper written by Bengt Gustafsson (Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces 1986-94) in 2007, based partly on interviews with various ranking former Soviet officers (usually in service with ex-Soviet countries other than Russia when interviewed) — a General, a Colonel, an Admiral, and a Rear Admiral, plus various sundries — and partly on a variety of written sources, the primary objective of the Soviet strategy
vis-à-vis Sweden (and Finland) was one of isolation, not invasion.
They knew that Sweden's neutrality was a bit so-so, but based on Sweden's historic decisions, where the country stayed neutral during WWII, it was believed that Sweden would do likewise in a new major conflict in Europe, and stand by its official policy.
So, in the initial phases of a conflict, a push into northern Norway through Finnmark and the Barents Sea, and one through the Danish Straits into Kattegat-Skagerrak and landing in South-Eastern Norway, would hopefully isolate Sweden, and "encourage" the country not to take active part in the conflict.
It was only in a possible follow-up scenario, assuming that initial isolation hadn't been able to succeed by the time American reinforcements came into play in earnest, that plan B — entailing violation of Swedish sovereign territory — would be put in motion.
Hence, the scenario of a pre-emptive invasion of Sweden seems to never have been on the table. Any invasion would indeed happen as part of an on-going larger conflict.